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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
BIBAS, Circuit Judge. 
To intervene is to butt in, not to be dragged in or to replace 
an existing party to a lawsuit. But no one butted in here. Three 
people formed a partnership to sue several pharmaceutical 
companies as a qui tam relator under the False Claims Act. 
When one of them left the partnership and was replaced, that 
change amounted to forming a new partnership. The compa-
nies moved to dismiss because the Act’s first-to-file bar stops 
a new “person” from “interven[ing] or bring[ing] a related ac-
tion based on the [same] facts.” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5). But the 
verb “intervene” means to inject oneself between two existing 
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parties, as under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24. The new 
partnership did not do that, but instead came in as the relator.  
Still, the District Court ruled for the companies, based 
mainly on a dictum from a Supreme Court case. But that case 
involved a very different issue, and the Court’s opinion never 
considered the issue here. Because the Act’s plain text bars 
only intervention or bringing a related suit, we will vacate and 
remand. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The partnership and the complaints 
In 2011, Jeffrey Stahl, Kelly Evans, and John Venditto 
formed a Delaware limited liability partnership named JKJ (af-
ter their three first initials). Venditto and Stahl were doctors, 
and Evans was a former sales representative at Sanofi-Aventis. 
The partnership’s sole purpose was to prosecute a qui tam 
False Claims Act suit against Sanofi-Aventis and Bristol-My-
ers Squibb, two pharmaceutical companies that developed and 
marketed the anti-clotting drug Plavix. So JKJ filed this suit in 
federal district court. 
The gist of the suit was that Sanofi and Bristol had pro-
moted Plavix to treat a broad range of patients, even though 
they knew that many of them would reap little if any benefit. 
Sanofi and Bristol’s marketing, JKJ alleged, caused many false 
claims to be submitted for federal and state healthcare reim-
bursement. JKJ alleged False Claims Act claims on behalf of 
the United States, as well as claims on behalf of dozens of 
states under their own qui tam statutes.  
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The complaints named JKJ as the sole plaintiff-relator. 
While the early complaints discussed the three partners’ back-
grounds, they did not name them, using pseudonyms instead. 
The United States declined to intervene in the suit.  
By 2016, the partners’ relations had apparently soured. 
Venditto left and was replaced by Dr. Paul Gurbel. The second 
amended complaint, the one at issue, was filed in 2017 and 
names all three partners. But it still names JKJ as the sole rela-
tor. The partners viewed the old JKJ partnership as the same 
entity as the new one. That theory would be tested in this suit’s 
pinball journey among three different state and federal courts. 
B. District Court proceedings 
Sanofi and Bristol moved to dismiss, invoking the False 
Claims Act’s first-to-file bar. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5); see 
United States ex rel. JKJ P’ship 2011, LLP v. Sanofi Aventis, 
U.S., LLC (In re Plavix Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. 
Litig. (No. II)), 315 F. Supp. 3d 817, 821–22 (D.N.J. 2018) (In 
re Plavix I). Sanofi and Bristol’s theory was that New JKJ was 
a different legal entity from Old JKJ, so its effort to pursue the 
suit as the relator amounted to an “interven[tion]” banned by 
the first-to-file bar. See In re Plavix I, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 830. 
The District Court agreed and dismissed the suit. In a care-
ful and comprehensive opinion, it thoroughly analyzed Dela-
ware partnership law, concluding that Old JKJ and New JKJ 
were distinct legal entities. In re Plavix I, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 
830–34. Because the two entities were different, the District 
Court held that New JKJ’s presence violated the first-to-file 
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bar. Id. at 834–35. It relied heavily on a Supreme Court deci-
sion, United States ex rel. Eisenstein v. City of New York, 556 
U.S. 928, 933–35 (2009), which it read as holding that when-
ever a nonparty tries to join a qui tam False Claims Act suit, it 
is “interven[ing]” within the meaning of the first-to-file bar. 
See Plavix I, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 834–35. It also relied on a re-
cent Tenth Circuit decision that read Eisenstein the same way. 
Id. at 835–36 (discussing United States ex rel. Little v. Triumph 
Gear Sys., Inc., 870 F.3d 1242 (10th Cir. 2017)). Because the 
District Court read Eisenstein’s rule as barring a new relator 
from replacing an old one in an amended complaint, it dis-
missed JKJ’s suit. Id. 
C. Delaware Supreme Court proceedings 
The partnership appealed to us. Recognizing the important 
role that Delaware partnership law plays here, we certified 
three questions to the Delaware Supreme Court. The Delaware 
Supreme Court accepted the certification and assisted us by an-
swering them. First, it agreed with the District Court that Old 
JKJ and New JKJ were distinct partnerships. United States ex 
rel. JKJ P’ship 2011 LLP v. Sanofi-Aventis U.S. LLC, 226 A.3d 
1117, 1123 (Del. 2020) (In re Plavix II). Second, it could not 
answer whether Old JKJ survived long enough to file the com-
plaint now before us. Id. at 1133. But it noted that the second 
amended complaint named the three partners as Stahl, Evans, 
and Gurbel, so that complaint must have been filed by New 
JKJ. Id. Third, it explained that Old JKJ could not keep prose-
cuting the litigation as part of the winding-up process. Id. at 
1135–36. It did not see how liquidation could be “[ ]consistent 
with continuing with carrying on the business for which the 
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Partnership was established.” Id. at 1135. With these state-law 
issues addressed, the case is before us again. 
II. THE FIRST-TO-FILE BAR IS NOT JURISDICTIONAL 
First off, the parties dispute whether the first-to-file bar is 
jurisdictional. Sanofi and Bristol say that it is and thus that their 
motion to dismiss falls under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(1). But JKJ suggests that a qui tam complaint that vio-
lates § 3730(b)(5) merely fails to state a claim and thus that the 
motion falls under Rule 12(b)(6).  
The distinction sometimes matters. First, the plaintiff bears 
the burden of persuasion on jurisdiction, while the burden of 
showing that a complaint fails to state a claim falls on the de-
fendant. Davis v. Wells Fargo, 824 F.3d 333, 349 (3d Cir. 
2016). Second, a defendant challenging subject-matter juris-
diction may sometimes submit evidence, while on Rule 
12(b)(6) we must take the complaint’s well-pleaded allegations 
as true. Id. Finally, jurisdiction may be challenged at any time, 
even sua sponte by the court. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). But 
the failure-to-state-a-claim defense is waived if not raised “be-
fore the close of trial.” 5C Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. 
Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1392, at 530 (3d ed. 
2004). 
Our sister circuits are split on this question. The lower-
numbered circuits treat the first-to-file bar as not jurisdictional. 
See United States ex rel. Heath v. AT&T, Inc., 791 F.3d 112, 
120–21 (D.C. Cir. 2015); United States ex rel. McGuire v. Mil-
lennium Labs., Inc., 923 F.3d 240, 250–51 (1st Cir. 2019); 
United States ex rel. Hayes v. Allstate Ins. Co., 853 F.3d 80, 
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85–86 (2d Cir. 2017) (per curiam). The higher-numbered cir-
cuits take the opposite view, mainly in older opinions. See 
United State ex rel. Carter v. Halliburton Co., 710 F.3d 171, 
181 (4th Cir. 2013); United States ex rel. Branch Consultants 
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 560 F.3d 371, 376–77 (5th Cir. 2009); Wal-
burn v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 431 F.3d 966, 970 (6th Cir. 
2005); United States ex rel. Lujan v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 243 
F.3d 1181, 1187–89 (9th Cir. 2001); Grynberg v. Koch Gate-
way Pipeline Co., 390 F.3d 1276, 1278 (10th Cir. 2004). As 
the Third Circuit, our number falls in the middle. 
We hold that the first-to-file bar is not jurisdictional. As the 
Supreme Court has recently instructed, unless Congress states 
clearly that a rule is jurisdictional, we will treat it as nonjuris-
dictional. Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 568 U.S. 145, 
153 (2013); see, e.g., Fort Bend County v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 
1843, 1850 (2019). The contrary circuit cases mostly predate 
these Supreme Court cases and do not apply the Court’s clear-
statement rule. Sanofi and Bristol point to no language in 
§ 3730(b)(5), nor do we see any, that “plainly show[s] that Con-
gress imbued [the first-to-file] bar with jurisdictional conse-
quences.” United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U.S. 402, 410 
(2015). The bar could have referred to jurisdiction or to a dis-
trict court’s power to review claims directly. Heath, 791 F.3d 
at 120. It did not. On the contrary, the bar on intervention kicks 
in only after a party has filed a suit over which the court al-
ready has jurisdiction.  
If Congress had meant to make the first-to-file bar jurisdic-
tional, it would have logically placed the bar in one of two 
other sections that mention jurisdiction and were added at the 
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same time as it. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3730(e)(1), (2)(A), 3732 (cap-
tion); False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
562, §§ 3, 6(a), 100 Stat. 3153, 3155, 3157–58. Instead, Con-
gress put it in § 3730(b), alongside other run-of-the-mill proce-
dural rules. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) (service and fil-
ing).  
Lacking a clear statement, Sanofi and Bristol rely on prin-
ciples of Article III standing. They note that the Article III in-
jury is suffered not by the relator, but by the Government. See 
Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 
U.S. 765, 771, 773–74 (2000). So, they argue, the first-to-file 
bar shows which parties have standing to sue on behalf of the 
United States. But the first-to-file bar is a matter of statutory 
authorization, not constitutional standing. The first-to-file bar 
asks only “whether [the relator] falls within the class of plain-
tiffs whom Congress has authorized to sue,” which is another 
way to ask whether the statute gives it a cause of action. 
Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 
U.S. 118, 128 (2014). It is not about “the court’s statutory or 
constitutional power to adjudicate the case.” Id. at 128 n.4 
(quoting Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 535 U.S. 635, 
643 (2002)).  
Because the first-to-file bar is not jurisdictional, Sanofi and 
Bristol’s motion to dismiss falls under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure 
to state a claim. On to the merits. 
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III. THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT DOES NOT BAR  
NEW RELATORS FROM ENTERING A QUI TAM SUIT 
Parties may sue under the False Claims Act in two ways. 
First, the Attorney General may sue anyone who violates the 
Act. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(a). Second, any person may bring a qui 
tam suit in the Government’s name. Id. § 3730(b)(1). When a 
private person (the relator) brings a qui tam suit, the Govern-
ment may choose to intervene. Id. § 3730(b)(2). Whether the 
Government intervenes or not, it gets the bulk of the recovery. 
See id. § 3730(d). If it chooses to intervene, it takes over the 
lead as plaintiff; if not, the relator keeps prosecuting the suit. 
Id. § 3730(c)(1), (3). 
The False Claims Act’s first-to-file bar provides:  
When a person brings an action under this sub-
section, no person other than the Government 
may intervene or bring a related action based on 
the facts underlying the pending action. 
31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5). 
This text, we hold, has a straightforward meaning. In nor-
mal civil litigation, there are three ways for nonparties with in-
terests relevant to a suit to become parties to a suit. They can 
intervene in the existing suit. They can file their own related 
suits based on the same facts. Or they can be added to the ex-
isting suit by the court or the existing parties. In False Claims 
Act qui tam suits, the first-to-file bar precludes the first two 
options, but not the third. So long as the new party is named in 
the (likely amended) complaint, there is no problem. This read-
ing follows from the plain meaning of the term “intervene.” 
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And nothing in the Supreme Court’s opinion in Eisenstein is to 
the contrary. 
A. The first-to-file bar’s plain meaning 
We start with the word’s plain meaning. “Intervene” comes 
from the Latin venire, “to come,” plus the prefix inter-, “be-
tween.” Intervene, Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed. 1989). 
To “intervene” is “[t]o come between in action; to interfere, 
interpose.” Id. (def. 3a). An entity that intervenes does not be-
come one of two sides; it “come[s] between” existing sides. 
Intervene, Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 
(1966). Often, intervention is not done at the behest or even 
with the acquiescence of the existing parties. See, e.g., id. (def. 
1) (“to enter or appear as an irrelevant or extraneous feature or 
circumstance”); id. (def. 3) (“to come in or between by way of 
hindrance or modification”). In short, a third party intervenes 
when he injects himself between two existing sides, not when 
he is drawn in or becomes one side or another.  
The legal sense of intervention reflects the word’s etymol-
ogy and plain English meaning. “Intervention” is “[t]he entry 
into a lawsuit by a third party who, despite not being named a 
party to the action, has a personal stake in the outcome.” Inter-
vention, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (def. 1). So in 
law, a party who “intervene[s]” invokes “[t]he legal procedure 
by which such a third party is allowed to become a party to the 
litigation.” See id. (def. 2). The choice to intervene is made not 
by the existing parties, but by the intervenor. An “intervenor” 
is “[o]ne who voluntarily enters a pending lawsuit because of 
a personal stake in it.” Intervenor, in id. (emphasis added). In 
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the federal courts, this process is governed by Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 24. 
Intervention is distinct from joinder, a way that existing 
parties can bring a third party into a lawsuit. See Joinder, 
Black’s Law Dictionary, supra. Required joinder ensures the 
presence of a necessary party. Fed. R. Civ. P. 19. Permissive 
joinder consolidates parties who might otherwise be involved 
in related but distinct actions. Id. R. 20. Either way, joinder is 
begun by the existing parties or the court. Intervention, by con-
trast, involves a nonparty’s motion to enter a suit to protect its 
interests, whether or not the existing parties want its company. 
Id. R. 24(a)–(b). 
And there are other ways for parties to enter a lawsuit. For 
instance, a defendant can implead a nonparty who might be li-
able to it for part of the claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 14(a)(1). A party 
facing potentially duplicative liability can interplead all the 
parties to whom it might be liable. Id. R. 22(a). Or if a party 
dies, the court can substitute its successor or representative. Id. 
R. 25(a)(1). 
What distinguishes intervention from these other methods 
of adding new parties is that it requires action by an outside 
party who seeks a seat at the table. See 7C Charles Alan Wright 
et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 1901, at 257–60 (3d 
ed. 2007). Given that distinction, Congress would not have 
chosen the specific verb “intervene” to express the general con-
cept of entry into a suit, no matter who initiated it or how. See 
Mississippi ex. rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 571 U.S. 161, 
169–70 (2014) (presuming “Congress is aware of existing law 
when it passes legislation,” including “Federal Rule of Civil 
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Procedure 20, governing party joinder” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)).  
By contrast, when Congress meant to refer to a broader 
class of parties entering suits, it covered “claims that involve 
the joinder or intervention of additional parties.” 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1367(a) (emphasis added) (defining federal courts’ supple-
mental jurisdiction). Congress chose to draft that statute more 
broadly, but the first-to-file bar more narrowly. If Congress had 
wanted the first-to-file bar to reach more broadly, it would have 
said so. But it chose a “narrower” term (intervention), and we 
must “respect, not disregard,” that choice. Wis. Cent. Ltd. v. 
United States, 138 S. Ct. 2067, 2072 (2018). 
To be sure, other provisions of the False Claims Act limit 
who can be a proper plaintiff. For instance, when the allega-
tions underlying the suit have already been disclosed publicly, 
no private party can sue unless it is “an original source of the 
information.” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A). But beyond barring 
intervention, the first-to-file bar itself says nothing about other 
ways in which third parties may enter an existing suit. 
A final note: The False Claims Act does provide for a spe-
cial kind of intervention by the Government. When the Gov-
ernment chooses to intervene, it does not remain a third party 
between two existing parties. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1)–(2), 
(c)(3) (describing Government intervention). Rather, even 
though the relator is still a party to the case, the Government 
takes over the relator’s “primary” role in pursuing it. Id. 
§ 3730(c)(1). But this special kind of intervention occurs only 
when the Government intervenes, not when a private party 
does. It works differently not because of the first-to-file bar, 
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but because of the special Government-control provision in 
§ 3730(c)(1). And the text of the first-to-file bar limits its scope 
to intervention by private parties, not the Government. Id. 
§ 3730(b)(5). Thus, we see no reason to give “intervene” in that 
bar a unique meaning specific to the False Claims Act. 
B. Eisenstein is silent on the question before us 
Resisting this reading of the statute, Sanofi and Bristol rely 
on the Supreme Court’s decision in Eisenstein. But Eisenstein 
addressed a very different question: the time limit for filing a 
notice of appeal in False Claims Act suits. See 556 U.S. at 929. 
Typically, parties to civil cases have 30 days, but when the 
United States is a party, the limit is 60 days. See Fed. R. App. 
P. 4(a)(1)(A)–(B). The Court held that even though False 
Claims Act suits are always on behalf of the United States, the 
Government is not a “party” to the litigation for purposes of 
appellate procedure when it has declined to intervene. Id. at 
937.  
In reaching its conclusion, the Court discussed the relation-
ship between the terms “party” and “intervention.” See Eisen-
stein, 556 U.S. at 932–34. “[W]hen the term [to intervene] is 
used in reference to legal proceedings, it covers the right of one 
to interpose in, or become a party to, a proceeding already in-
stituted.” Id. at 933 (emphasis and second alteration in original) 
(quoting Rocca v. Thompson, 223 U.S. 317, 330 (1912)). Be-
cause intervening is how the United States becomes a party to 
a qui tam suit, the Court held, it is not a party unless it inter-
venes. Id. 
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The first-to-file bar was not before the Eisenstein Court. 
Nor did Eisenstein turn on the meaning of “intervene.” So 
Sanofi and Bristol’s reliance on Eisenstein hinges on a single 
sentence from the discussion referred to above: “The Court has 
further indicated that intervention is the requisite method for a 
non-party to become a party to a lawsuit.” 556 U.S. at 933. 
According to Bristol and Sanofi, this sentence proves that in-
tervention is not just one way, but the only way, for a party to 
enter a lawsuit. The Tenth Circuit has likewise taken that broad 
a view of Eisenstein’s dictum. United States ex rel. Little v. 
Triumph Gear, 870 F.3d at 1246–48. Put another way, any time 
a party enters (or becomes a party in) a lawsuit, it must have 
intervened. 
We reject this overreading. We must read Eisenstein, like 
any opinion, in context. Judicial opinions are not statutes, from 
which we squeeze all we can out of every last word. Rather, 
we try to understand the Court’s language against the backdrop 
of the particular controversy that the Court was resolving. See, 
e.g., Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 424 (2004); Cohens v. 
Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399 (1821) (Marshall, C.J.). 
Eisenstein was about appellate timing and Government inter-
vention, not the first-to-file bar for private parties. The parties 
neither briefed nor argued about how private parties intervene. 
The bar’s plain text, not a stray dictum about that text, resolves 
its meaning. 
Thus, the first-to-file bar reaches intervention under Rule 
24 or the bringing of a new action on the same facts, but not 
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other methods of joining an existing case like joinder, substi-
tution of parties, or amendment of a complaint. So it does not 
bar New JKJ’s participation as a relator here. 
IV. WE DECLINE TO RESOLVE MOST  
OF THE RESIDUAL ISSUES 
Just because New JKJ can take part without violating the 
first-to-file bar does not mean that it is taking part as a matter 
of partnership law and ordinary civil procedure. Deciding 
whether New JKJ is properly a relator depends on record ma-
terials and recent developments that the District Court never 
had the chance to consider. Rather than hazard answers, we 
will instead send the case back to let the District Court answer 
those lingering questions first.  
A. Important considerations for remand 
To guide the District Court on remand, we flag several is-
sues that bear on whether New JKJ is a proper relator. 
First, Sanofi and Bristol argue that the second amended 
complaint’s allegations are so different from those that ap-
peared earlier that they make the amendment improper. As 
noted, even wholesale changes in a complaint do not implicate 
the first-to-file bar, as long as the relator does not bring a new 
“action.” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5). But we offer no view on 
whether, as a matter of generic civil procedure, this amendment 
might exceed the bounds of Rule 15. 
Second, the Delaware Supreme Court found that both New 
and Old JKJ are aggregate partnerships. In re Plavix II, 226 
A.3d at 1132–33. A key feature of aggregate partnerships is 
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that they cannot sue or be sued in their own names. See id. at 
1123. So one could question whether either partnership was 
ever a proper relator. The District Court should decide whether 
that is true and, if so, whether to allow amendment so that the 
partners can name themselves as the real relators in interest. 
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a)(3). 
Third, the District Court will need to decide whether Old 
JKJ or New JKJ owns this lawsuit. While this appeal was pend-
ing, the partnership executed an agreement purporting to trans-
fer this litigation asset. Perhaps the agreement was unneces-
sary: perhaps the change in membership and concomitant dis-
solution of Old JKJ and the formation of New JKJ automati-
cally transferred the asset from the former to the latter. If not, 
the District Court should determine whether the suit could be 
transferred and whether Old JKJ had the power to transfer it as 
part of its winding-up process. 
This list of issues for remand is not exhaustive. The court 
is free to take up other matters as it sees fit. 
B. Property stakes in qui tam suits are transferrable 
Though we leave many of these issues for remand, we will 
settle one last False Claims Act issue. Sanofi and Bristol argue 
that the Anti-Assignment Act bars a qui tam relator from ever 
assigning its interest in a suit. 31 U.S.C. § 3727. A qui tam re-
lator is, of course, entitled to a share of the Government’s re-
covery. So, they assert, transferring the relator’s interest in the 
action would amount to a forbidden “transfer or assignment of 
any part of a claim against the United States Government or an 
interest in the claim.” Id. § 3727(a)(1). 
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That argument fails. Whether a plaintiff sues for itself or 
for another, its claim is “against” the defendant, not “against” 
any real party in interest who might get a share of the recovery. 
The relator might eventually have a claim against the Govern-
ment if the Government recovered a judgment and refused to 
give the relator its share. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1). But the 
first suit does not assert a “claim against the United States 
Government.” Id. § 3727(a)(1) (emphasis added). 
* * * * * 
The False Claims Act’s first-to-file bar stops new relators 
from intervening in other parties’ suits or bringing their own 
separate suits based on the same facts. Yet it does not bar par-
ties from amending a complaint to add, remove, or swap rela-
tors. While some courts have overread the Supreme Court’s 
dictum in Eisenstein to suggest otherwise, our touchstone is the 
statutory text. The District Court’s otherwise thoughtful opin-
ion missed this point. So we will vacate and remand for further 
proceedings. 
